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clause. Limitations on judicial power, he argued, were less a matter of textual
prohibitions than self-restraint. Zines's may be right to see some limit on
judicial discretion in the general limitations clause, but in this essay, at least,
the claim is more assertion than argument.
In his final essay, Zines addresses federalism and other supranational
features in the Commonwealth. Of particular interest is his comparison of
Canadian and Australian courts in policing the boundaries of federalism.
Again, judicial behavior is substantially affected by "underlying political
forces" (p. 97).
Underlying political forces are also the primary explanation for the
assertive role the European Court has assumed in the European Economic
Community. In this chapter, then, as in the first, Zines subordinates constitutional interpretation to larger political forces: an assertive European Court is
in many ways a consequence of an organic law, the Treaty of Rome, that
envisions a united community. The court therefore approaches the treaty's
"federalism" provisions, he argues, not as a catalogue or divided subjects, but
as aspirations to be achieved.
The distinction between subjects and aspirations is tidy but trite. Like the
observations on judicial discretion in chapter two, it surely needs elaboration.
As these two instances suggest, Zines sometimes makes interesting and
provocative comments in a desultory, off-hand manner. His failure to follow
through in such cases is disappointing, but may be caused by economies of
time and space in the original lectures. Notwithstanding these occasional
omissions, this book is a notable addition to the literature on comparative
constitutional law.
—John E. Finn

NATIONAL SOCIALISM AND THE RULE OF LAW
IngoMuller,Hjtkr's/MstJcc77ie Courts oftheVrirdReich. Translated by Deborah
Lucas Schneider. (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991. Pp. 368.
$29.95.)
Ingo Muller'sbook, originally published
Juris
ublished in 1987 asFurchtbare Juristen:
Die
nbewaltigte Vergangenheit
Vergangenheit unserer
unserer Justiz
Justiz (literally
(literally "Dreadful
"Dreadful Jurists:
Jurists: The
1 Reunbewaltigte
morseless Past of Our Judiciary"), describes the moral collapse of the German
the construction and maintenance
rah Lucas Schneider, Hitler's
' legal professionals betrayed their trust as
lawyers, prosecutors, and judges and, second, to assess the degree to which
Germany in the postwar period reformed its legal system, purged the judiciary of former Nazis, and rededicated itself to the rule of law. Detlev Vagt's
short introduction to the English edition helps to orient the non-German
reader. It contains an overview of Germany's court system, a sketch of the
legal profession's organization, a note on the controversies about the role of
lawyers and judges under National Socialism, and a summary of the allied
effort to reform the German legal system after the war.
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The main message of this book is that lawyers and judges trained to serve
the Rechtsstaat (a state based on the rule of law) had instead subverted it by
going along with Hitler and his criminal regime. Like physicians, professors,
and even clergymen—members of professions dedicated to serving human
needs-lawyers and judges, far from opposing injustice, actually helped to
perpetuate it. The judiciary's record by any standard is a tale of iniquity, its
collusion with evil having already begun during the Weimar period when
judges antagonistic to constitutional democracy openly sympathized with
Nazi defendants charged with committing acts of violence against their
political enemies. Thus, as the author argues, the German judiciary compromised its integrity even before the Nazis took over.
There follows an account of the various ways in which lawyers, prosecutors, and judges subverted the Rechtsstaat during the Nazi years. We find them
making a mockery of the Reichstag fire trial; conducting political trials and
bullying defendants in open court; confining political prisoners to inhuman
prison conditions; driving Jews out of the bar and off the bench; depriving
them in turn of all other rights of citizenship, even to the point of imposing the
death sentence for petty offenses; formulating policies that allowed physicians to experiment genetically on disabled people and to kill persons regarded as unworthy of life; organizing special courts for the prosecution of
"asocial elements" and "political and military enemies of the state"; and
"correcting" the decisions of regular courts to the disadvantage of litigants or
defendants disfavored by the state.
These perversions of justice were real. They happened, and the author
hammers home the reality of what happened by parading before the reader
example after example of judicial lawlessness and legalized terror. Much of
this story, based heavily on court records and other official reports, has been
told before. Actually, this book is intended to refute studies that defend or
explain away the record of the judiciary during the Third Reich, seeking to
demolish any interpretation of that record that would diminish the extent of
its contribution to the rise and acceptance of the Nazi state. Hence, armed with
information selected from the sources just mentioned and citing chapter and
verse of laws and regulations that sanctioned Hitler's justice, the author
proceeds to indict the entire judicial establishment.
Muller powerfully substantiates his indictment, yet somehow the indictment is not sustained by the evidence adduced. He gives the reader snapshots
of the judicial role under the Nazis, and while such snapshots build a case for
an unquestionably broad condemnation they do not warrant the conclusion
that the judiciary or the legal profession was totally corrupt. We read, for
example, that only one "stout-hearted" judge~Dr. Lothar Kreyssig—"refused
to serve the [Nazi] regime from the bench" (p. 196), an assertion that verges
on being an ipse dixit. Did not other judges resist the pressure to do evil, even
if only by the smallest acts of insubordination? By the author's own account
Nazi officials had to "correct" a large number of judicial decisions, belying the
impression of a totally tainted judiciary. He also reminds us that "Hitler...
considered jurists 'complete fools' incapable of recognizing what measures
the state had to take" (p. 174). If Hitler had really had his way he would, like
Dick the Butcher in Shakespeare's Henry VI, have killed all the lawyers.
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Hitter's Justice presses the claim, as already suggested, that the judiciary-and indeed the entire legal establishment—succumbed to the temptation of
evil. It presses that claim too far, however, and ignores evidence that tends to
undermine its wholesale condemnation of the judiciary. In this regard, it is
interesting to compare Midler's book with Marck Linder's recent study of the
Supreme Labor Court {The Supreme Labor Court in Nan Germany: A Jurisprudential Analysis [Frankfurt am Main: Vittoria Klostermann, 1987]). A careful
study of the published decisions of the Reichsarbeitsgericht between 1933 and
1945, it is a nuanced account of the court's work, for it resists the temptation
to charge the judiciary en masse with carrying out the will of the Nazi regime.
Under is able to show, for example, that in labor contract cases the court
retained a large measure of its autonomy, resorting in some instances to rigid
formalistic reasoning as a way of ignoring the Volk-consciousness that was
supposed to inform its decisions. Even Jews who lost their jobs or pension
rights as a result of a company's "aryranization" were successful in their suits
before this tribunal. In short. Lindens study supports Ernst Fraenkel's notion
of a dual state in which a system of Nazi justice, practiced mainly in special
courts and criminal tribunals, coexisted along side of courts that interpreted
law much as they had done before 1933.
Another and consequent problem is the book's unevenness and anecdotal
character. Anecdotes—stories of victims and their oppressors—do capture the
reality of Hitler's justice but these tales of injustice do not tell the full story of
bench and bar between 1933 and 1945. In addition, some topics are covered in
a flash while others are treated at length. The author devotes thirty pages to
the Nuremberg laws and only three each to chapters on Hitler's euthanasia
program and the deeds of lawyers in the civil service. In a two-page chapter
(pp. 138-139) on "the arbitrary decisions of everyday life" he is satisfied with
citing decisions of six different courts, including the Prussian Administrative
Court of Appeals and the Supreme Labor Court.
Perhaps we should overlook the omissions in Mutter's account. After all,
the criminal actions of some courts and judges need to be placed under a
magnifying glass if only as a reminder that educated elites are as susceptible
as the unwashed masses to becoming unwitting as well as willing participants
in the commission of evil. The last part of the book, however, in which the
author assesses the Federal Republic's record in "overcoming the past," is less
excusable. Here the book recedes into injudicious criticism of the Federal
Republic's effort to reform the judiciary and the legal profession.
Miiller speaks of the postwar "re-Nazification" of the German judiciary
which in his view has had a profound effect on the development of democracy
in West Germany" (p. 203). The charge of "re-Nazification" rests on the large
number of former National Socialists who were apparently reappointed to the
judiciary after the War. Rightly, Miiller condemns the reappointment of
judges who were implicated in Nazi crimes, but mere membership in the Nazi
party could and should not have been a disqualifying factor in judicial
appointments since judges and lawyers who joined the party did so for a wide
variety of reasons ranging from mere expediency to ideological conviction.
Karl Jaspers once distinguished between four kinds of guilt among men and
women who lived and worked in Nazi Germany, namely, metaphysical,
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moral, political, and criminal. Mulleins account is inattentive to these distinctions.
The author's description of the German judiciary after 1945 is also
limited. Indeed, it resolves itself into a partisan account. Three items may be
cited to illustrate the partisanship. The first is his criticism of the postwar
revival of natural law in Germany or certain "supra-positive" standards of
judicial review, a criticism that recalls his attack, earlier in the book, on
teleological methods of inquiry used by certain courts during the Weimar
Republic. Here the author tries to rescue legal positivism from the familiar
charge that it caused the breakdown of the rule of law during the Nazi period.
He is surely right to attack this oversimplified view of legal positivism, but he
is surely wrong to suggest that teleological analysis or natural law thought in
its West German incarnation is a continuation of old ways of legal thinking.
Teleologicalinquiry is in factastandardmodeof analysis in many constitutional
courts today, including the European Court of Justice.
Second, and relatedly, the author barely conceals his political leanings in
condemning the generally conservative work-product of the West German
judiciary, including decisions relating to internal security, reinstatement of
civil servants, and reparation payments to certain opponents of Nazi injustice.
The author isrightlycritical of these decisions, but he fails to make the case that
the postwar judiciary has on the whole served as a conservative and thus, for
him, an antidemocratic force in German politics. Actually, the postwar record
of the German judiciary in defending democratic values is probably no better
or worse than the record of the judiciary elsewhere in western Europe or for
that matter in the United States.
Finally, the author calls attention to the fact that Willi Geiger, a justice of
the Federal Constitutional Court for 26 years (1951-1977), wrote the 1975
decision that constitutionally sustained a governmental decree to bar radicals
from the public service, asserting in passing that Geiger served as a prosecutor
of a special court where he "had successfully pleaded for at least five death
sentences" (p. 218). Miiller then proceeds to link the Constitutional Court's
antiradicals decision to the "undemocratic and authoritarian view" that he—
Geiger-expressed in an essay he wrote as a very young man in 1941. These
remarks are unworthy of the author, for they are as gratuitous as they are
unproven. In support of this charge he cites a virulently antigovernment tract
(Reckt Justiz undFaschismus nach 1933 und keute) published in 1984. He surely
must know that such sources of information, like East Germany's Braunbuch,
which he also frequently cites, lack credibility.
Several things might be said about the author's unfortunate remark about
Justice Geiger. First, no sources are dted to back up the claim that Geiger
authored the Constitutional Court's antiradicals opinion. Judicial opinions in
Germany are institutional products. Except for dissenting opinions on the
Federal Constitutional Court, authorship of judicial opinions is not a matter
of public record. Second, whatever one may think of the prudence or propriety
of the antiradicals case, it can be defended in terms of democratic theory.
Third, other justices with impeccable reputations were aligned with Geiger in
the majority: one was formerly a leading Social Democratic member of the
Bundestag; another was imprisoned by the Nazis for his participation in the
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officers' revolt against Hitler. Fourth, as one of its first appointees Geiger
could not have been elected to the Federal Constitutional Court had he fatally
compromised himself during the Nazi years. Indeed, several of the persons
responsible for his elevation to the court were themselves imprisoned or
persecuted by the Nazis.
None of this is to suggest that West Germany's judicial record is beyond
criticism, or that the German legal profession has fully come to terms with its
past. One only wishes that Hitler's Justice had offered the reader a more balanced account of both the judicial role during the Third Reich and West
Germany's record after World War II.
-Donald P. Kommers

A PLURAL THEORY OF PROPERTY
Stephen R. Munzer A Theory of Property. (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1990. Pp. x, 491. $55.00.)
Some theorists maintain that justification for holdings in private property
is fundamentally unitary; there is some one dominant factor that sanctions
patterns or rules of ownership. Locke's labor theory isa unitary account; so too
is a utilitarian treatment of the rationale of property or a Marxian prescription
of "to each according to his need." (I do not mean to deny that these accounts
come attached to various codicils and qualifications.)
Other theorists reject unitary justification. They maintain that a full and
satisfactory theory of property will contain a plurality of irreducible normative
principles. Munzer's important A Theory of Property is, in this sense, avowedly
pluralist. He identifies three independent principles governing property
claims: (1) a principle of utility and efficiency; (2) a principle of justice and
equality; (3) a principle of desert based on labor. The principles are not
hierarchically ordered; that is, in contrast with Rawls's principles of justice,
there is no algorithm for determining which takes precedence in cases of
conflict. Munzer's theory is thus intuitionistic in the sense that conflicts are to
be adjudicated through case-by-case judgments of overall moral
satisfactoriness. His explanation and defense of the methodology of
intuitionistic pluralism is both sophisticated and a persuasive counter to those
theorists who allege the existence of an "Archimedean point" from which all
conflicts can be resolved. In this respect, and others. Theory of Property has a
philosophical importance that extends beyond thetheoryofproperty narrowly
construed.
Theory of Property opens with a presentation of the standard Hohfeldian
classification of rights, illustrating its relevance to property relations. Munzer
then offers a modified Hegelian account of why ownership of property is a
matter of normative significance to individuals. Through making things in the
world one's own one thereby projects oneself as a morally considerable being
onto the social realm. Property, he argues, confers on its owners the important
goods of control, privacy and individuality. That is why we have reason to

